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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ALVIE PETERSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-v.-

ROYDON K. McCULLOUGH, dba
ROYDON K. McCULLOUGH CO.,
Defendant and Appellant,

No. 8298

-v.-

HENRY L. ASHTON, et al.,
Third-party Defendants,
and respondents,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACT
Plaintiff brought this action. contending a breach of
contract on the part of defendant. The facts are as follows:
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract
on November 2, 1949, wherein, defendant for stipulated

a
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sum agreed to construct a theater building for plaintiff. (See
Exh. P-1,) On April13, 1950, defendant turned said theater
building over to plaintiff and plaintiff took possession of
the same and commenced his theater operation. (R 835,
R 322). Said building contract provides that final payment shall be made, "ten days after substantial completion
of the work provided the work be then fully completed and
the Contract fully performed." (P-1) Final payment was
made by plaintiff at the time of taking possession of the
building by plaintiff issuing to defendant a promissory note
for $1,000.00, the final balance owing on said contract, and
which note was finally paid in full by plaintiff to defendant
personally on March 1, 1951. (R 837)
Approximately the first part of January 1950, prior to
plaintiff taking possession of said building, there arose
some differences with reference to the construction of said
building and as a result plaintiff and defendant and defendant's subcontractor Henry L. Ashton entered into a separate
agreement ( P -5), wherein it was agreed that defendant and
his subcontractor would "thoroughly point up and fill all rna·
sonry joints in the exterior of the hollow block masonry
work," of said building and "would paint the exterior walls
with a heavy coat of lead and oil paint." This work was to
be done in full compensation for the failure of defendant and
his subcontractor to install certain items of steel, in the
hollow block pilasters and walls, in a satisfactory manner,
also for their failure to fill pilaster cores with cement mor·
tar and "to completely bed vertical block joints." (P-5) Sub·
sequent to the signing of said agreement of January 7, 1950,
defendant and his subcontractor proceeded with the con·
struction work. Plaintiff visited the premises on an average
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of twice a day, inspected the work, and when it came time
to do the painting of the exterior walls plaintiff selected
the color of the paint to be used and was present when at
least part of the wall was being painted. Plaintiff at no
time complained or objected to the way in which the paint
was applied or that the joints had not properly filled or tooled
according to the agreement of January 7, 1950. ( R 340,
341,342,345,1291,1292,282, 308)
Further, on the 19th of April 1951, plaintiff requested
defendant to submit a bid on an additional portion of the
building. At that time plaintiff had been in possession of
the building over one year, however, plaintiff made no
objection at that time with reference to the construction of
the original building. ( R 334, 341.)
The defendant sublet a portion of the construction of
said building. On November 3, 1949, defendant entered
into a subcontract agreement with Henry L. Ashton, that pursuant thereto, Henry L. Ashton agreed to do the masonry
work for said building in accordance with the plans and
specifications of the original contract entered into between
plaintiff and defendant. (R 162-156 incl.) That on or
about November 3, 1949, defendant entered into a subcontract agreement with William A. Earl and William A. Earl
Jr. dba, William A. Earl and Son, plastering contractors,
whereby William A. Earl and William A. Earl Jr. agreed to
do the lathing and plastering in said building in accordance
with the plans and specifications of the original contract between plaintiff and defendant. (R 83, 151)
On December 3, 1951, Plaintiff filed in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County a complaint, wherein he alleged that defendant had failed to fulfill said contract and
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complete construction of said building and that the portions
that were erected were erected in an unskillful and negligent
manner and of unsuitable and inferior materials. (R 1-57).
The action in the lower court was tried upon plaintiff's second amended complaint filed April14, 1953. (R 109-112)
Defendant in his answer denied that he had failed to fulfill
said contract in the manner set forth in plaintiff's complaint
and in addition thereto set forth the following defenses:
"That on or about April 13, 1950, said building
was completed, or substantially completed, according
to said contract, a copy of said contract being attached
to plaintiff's complaint as Exhibit 'A'. That on said
date, to-wit, April 13, 1950, plaintiff accepted said
building as complete and full performance by defendant of said contract.
"The Plaintiff failed within a reasonable time
after acceptance of said building to assert any defects,
or failure on the part of defendant to complete said
building or comply with the provisions of said contract;
therefore, plaintiff is now barred on the ground of
laches from asserting such defects, or failure on the
part of defendant to complete said building or to
comply with the provisions of said contract.
"That on January 7, 1950, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement, a copy of which is at·
tached hereto as Exhibit III and made a part of these
pleadings, whereby plaintiff asserted the defects in said
building which he alleged did not comply with said orig·
inal contract; and the said agreement of January 7,
1950, was entered into as a novation of said original
contract, and as accord and satisfaction of said original
contract.
"(a) That pursuant to said agreement of Janu·
ary 7, 1950, defendant agreed to perform additional
work not specified or required under said original con·
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tract as full compensation to plaintiff for alleged defects in said building.
"(b) That the additional work specified in said
agreement of January 7, 1950, was completed in a
satisfactory manner and accepted by plaintiff as a complete discharge of defendant's obligations to plaintiff
under said contracts.
"That plaintiff has waived any defects, faulty material or workmanship in said building and is therefore
estopped from making any claim for damages by reason
thereof from defendant."
(R 63-66 incl., 116, 117, 118, 170)
Defendant also moved the court to allow him to bring
in as third party defendants the subcontractor who did the
masonry work, and furnished the building stone and cinder
block, Henry L. Ashton, and the subcontractor on the lathing
and plastering, William A. Earl and William A. Earl Jr.
The court granted defendants' motion and these additional
parties were joined as third party defendants. ( R 119)
Defendant alleged in his third party complaint that Plaintiff was suing him for breach of the original contract, incorporated plaintiffs complaint as a part of his own complaint, alleged that third party defendants, as subcontractors,
agreed to construct a portion of said building and to do so
in accordance with the plans and specifications of the original contract between plaintiff and defendant, and prayed
that if the. court found for plaintiff on any portion of the
construction work which the subcontractors had agreed to
perform, then and in such case defendant have judgment
against said subcontractors in the same amount as plaintiff
was awarded judgment. Third party defendant William A.
Earl and William A. Earl Jr. answered and denied that their
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work was done in an unskillful or negligent manner and
further denied that unsuitable or inferior materials were
used by them in the construction. Further they set forth as
a specific defense the following:
"These answering Third Party Defendants allege
that the lathing and plastering work performed by them
was accepted by the Third Party Plaintiff, and Third
Party Plaintiff made no objection thereto and made
payment therefor in full to these answering Third Party
Defendants, and by reason thereof the Third Party Plain·
itff has waived, and is therefore estopped from making,
any claim for damages against these Third Party De·
fendants."

(R 151, 152)
Third Party Defendant Henry L. Ashton answered and
denied that his work was done in an unskillful or negligent
manner and denied that inferior or unsuitable materials were
used by him in the construction. Further he set forth as a
specific and affirmative defense the following:
"Further answering said third-party amended com·
plaint defendant, Henry L. Ashton, alleges that on or
about the 7th day of January, 1950, at the request of
the Plaintiff, Alvie Peterson, and Roydon K. McCul·
Iough, defendant, he agreed to undertake the expense
of doing extra work as set out in Exhibit 3 attached to
defendant's answer to plaintiff's second amended com·
plaint: that in accordance with said Agreement said
extra work was done as agreed and in an acceptable
manner to both plaintiff, Alvie Peterson and defendant,
Roydon K. McCullough; that the expense of said work
was undertaken by the defendant, Henry L. Ashton,
above and beyond the responsibility created by reason
of his contract with Roydon K. McCullough as set out
in Exhibit 2 herein referred to, and was undertaken by
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the defendant, Henry L. Ashton, for the express purpose
of satisfying both plaintiff, Alvie Peterson and defendant, Roydon K. McCullough, and did in fact so satisfy
both of said parties."
(R 163, 164, 165)
The case was heard before the Honorable Joseph L. Nelson sitting as the judge and the trier of fact. At the conclusion of the evidence a motion was made by Third Party
Defendant Buehner Cinder Block Co., that as to them the
action be dismissed. The court at that time stated: (R 1100)
"THE COURT: Taking up the motions in the order
they were presented to the Court, it will be the order of the
Court and the ruling of the Court that the motion of Buehner
Cinder Block Company, A Utah Corporation, to dismiss the
action or dismiss the complaint of Roydon K. McCullough
against said corporation be and the same is granted.
"It is the order of the Court and the ruling of the Court,
that the motion now before the Court of William Earl and
William Earl, Jr., known also as William A. Earl and Son,
Plastering Contractors, to dismiss the action as to them of the
defendant Roydon K. McCullough, be and the same is denied.
"It will be the order of the Court and the ruling of the
Court, that the motion of Henry L. Ashton, defendant herein,
to dismiss the action as to him of Roydon K. McCullough,
he and the same is denied.
"(Discussion by Mr. Boyer, relative to the presenting
of oral arguments, at this time.)
"MR. McCULLOUGH: The final judgment on all the
claims will be entered at one time?
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"THE COURT: Yes, but I am granting the motion
of the Buehner Block Company, at this time.
"MR. McCULLOUGH: We don't want appeal time to
run on one and not the others.
"THE COURT: It may be entered all as the same time.
"MR. NELSON: No objection.
"THE COURT: The Court will be in recess."
On the 4th of August 1954, the court filed a Memoran·
dum decision wherein he held that Plaintiff should have
judgment against defendant as follows: (R 166-180)
"For damages arising by reason of defective material
and work done in roofing building; damage to drapes, woodwork, equipment, decorations, etc.-$1,000.00.
"Expense and cost to

~epair

Ing.

roof or re-roof build$1,500.00

"For use of building stone and cinder block
different than that provided by contract, lack of
mortar in masonry work, and defective plaster requiring re-plastering of building.
$6,300.00
"For repairs to cement floors.

$ 300.00

"For loss of revenue during time building will
be under repair.
$ 357.66
"For removal, storage and replacement of
equipment.
$ 350.00
"Total Judgment.

$9,807.66."

As to Third Party Defendants Henry L. Ashton, the
masonry subcontractor, and who furnished the building stone
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and cinder block, the court held that Defendant and Third
Party Plaintiff Roydon K. McCullough had no cause of
action. As to William A. Earl and William A. Earl Jr., dba,
William A. Earl and Son, plastering contractors, the court
also held that Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, Roydon
K. McCullough, had no cause of action. The Court directed
that the prevailing parties prepare findings, conclusions .and
decree in accordance with his memorandum decision.
Findings, conclusions and judgment were submitted for
the Earls, the plaster subcontractor, and without notice to
Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, either by the court or
by the attorney for the Earls, and absolutely contrary to the
express order of the court that judgment would he entered
on all the claims at the same time as hereinabove set forth,
and without setting forth any reason, the Court signed
said judgment, and the same was filed of record August 12,
1954. The Court found in its conclusion the following:
"That Third Party Plaintiff, Roydon K. McCullough, has waived any claim he may have against Third
Party Defendants, William A. Earl and William A.
Earl, Jr., on account of lathing and plastering by said
Third Party Defendants in connection with said theatre
building. That the Third Party Defendants, William
A. Earl and William A. Earl, Jr., doing business as
William Earl and Son, Plastering Contractors, are entitled to a judgment against the Third Party Plaintiff,
Roydon K. McCullough, for no cause of action and for
costs incurred herein."
In the Findings of Fact the Court found the following:
"That the lathing and plastering work in connection with the construction of said theatre building,
as performed by said Third Party Defendants, Wil-
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liam A. Earl and William A. Earl, Jr., was by Third
Party Plaintiff, Roydon K. McCullough, accepted and
approved and said Third Party Plaintiff made no objection the~eto and paid for the same."
(R 183-186)
On October 4, 1954 plaintiff submitted findings, con·
elusions, and judgment, and so advised defendant. At that
time defendant was advised for the first time, that the court
had signed the Earl's judgment, contrary to the express order
and ruling of the court. Defendant on Oct. 7, 1954 filed
with the court a motion objecting to the court signing the
judgment of plaintiff and moving the court to vacate the
judgment of the Third Party Defendant Earls' until judg·
ment could he entered upon all of the claims at the same
time. At the time defendant submitted this motion the findings, conclusions and judgment of Third Party Defendant
Ashton and Buehner Cinder Block company had not even
been submitted to the court. On October 6, 1954 the court
signed plaintiff's judgment and the same was filed of record
October 7, 1954. (R 187, 188, 189-195)
On October 13, 1954, defendant and Third Party Plaintiff filed with the court a motion for a new trial as to all
of the parties and as to all of the issues. (Rl96)
On October 29, 1954, defendant filed with the court
another motion to vacate the findings, conclusions and judg·
ment of Plaintiff Peterson, signed on the 6th of October,
1954. ( R 198-200)
On the 9th of N ovemher, 1954, hearing was had upon
defendant's and Third Party Plaintiff's foregoing motions
and on the 12th day of November 1954, the Court signed
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an order denying the motion to set aside the findings, conclusions, and judgments of Plaintiff Peterson and Third
Party Defendant Earl, also denying the motion for a new
trial, and giving Third Party Defendant Ashton until November 19, 1954 to file findings, conclusions, and judgment,
otherwise defendant could do it for him. The plaintiff's
judgment was also corrected to the total amount of $9,571.26.
Said order of the court was filed of record November 16,
1954. (R-201-203)
On November 26, 1954, the court filed of record the
findings, conclusions, and judgment of Third Party Defendant
Henry L. Ashton. In the findings the court stated:
"That the masonry work in connection with the
construction of said theater and the materials used in
connection therewith by the Third Party Defendant,
Henry L. Ashton, was accepted and approved by the
Third Party Plaintiff, Roydon K. McCullough and said
Third Party Plaintiff made no objection thereto and accepted the responsibility thereof."
In the conclusions the court stated:
"That Third Party Plaintiff, Roydon K. McCullough, has waived any claim he may have against Third
Party Defendant, Henry L. Ashton, on account of
masonry work performed and materials supplied by said
Third Party Defendant in connection with the said theater building."
(R 205-210)
Notice of Appeal was filed December 8, 1954, by defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, appealing from the judgments and orders of the court. (R 211-212) On December
13, 1954, the court filed of record the findings, conclusions,
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and judgment of Third Party Defendant, Buehner Cinder
Block Company. (R 213, 218)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT USED A BUILDING STONE AND CINDER
BLOCK DIFFERENT THAN THAT PROVIDED BY THE
CONTRACT, FURTHER PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY
RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE HAD WITH REFERENCE TO
THE BLOCK USED IN THE SAID THEATER BY NOT
OBJECtiNG TO THEIR USE AFTER KNOWING OF THE
SAME.

II
PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE
HAD WITH REFERENCE TO THE COURT'S FINDING
OF A LACK OF MORTAR IN THE MASONRY AND IT
WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO AWARD
ANY DAMAGES FOR THE SAME.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SIGNING THE
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT OF WILLIAM A. EARL AND WILLIAM A.
EARL JR., THE PLASTERING SUBCONTRACTORS AND
FURTHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SPECIFI·
CALLY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE SAID JUDGMENT,
CONCLUSIONS AND FINDING PURSUANT TO DEFEND·
ANT'S MOTION.
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IV
PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED SAID THEATER BUILDING, TOOK POSSESSION OF THE SAME, PAID FOR
THE SAME AND MADE NO OBJECTION OR COMPLAINTS, THEREFORE PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ANY
RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE HAD AND IS NOW ESTOPPED
FROM CLAIMING DAMAGES, AND IT WAS ERROR FOR
THE LOWER COURT TO AWARD DAMAGES.

v
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
DEFENDANT AND THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF HAD
WAIVED ANY RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE HAD AGAINST
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT HENRY L. ASHTON, THE
MASONRY SUBCONTRACTORS, AND AGAINST WILLIAM A. EARL AND WILLIAM A. EARL JR., THE PLASTERING SUBCONTRACTORS.
ARGUMENT
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT DEFENDANT USED A BUILDING STONE
AND CINDER BLOCK DIFFERENT THAN THAT
PROVIDED BY THE CONTRACT, FURTHER PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE HAD
WITH REFERENCE TO THE BLOCK USED IN THE
SAID THEATER BY NOT OBJECTING TO THEIR
USE AFTER KNOWING OF THE SAME.
It is defendant's contention that the, "building stone
and cinder block," as the court calls them, complied in
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every respect to requirements of the plans and specifica·
tions of the contract between plaintiff and defendant. Every
bit of competent evidence submitted either by plaintiff's
witnesses or defendant's demonstrated that the building blocks
met the standards of the American Soci~ty for Testing Ma·
terials as specified in the contract. (R 398, 401, 413, 474·
476, 495, 496, 505, 511, 1054, 1055, 1133, 1134)
The specifications as set forth in the contract state:
(exh P-2, page 14)
"HOLLOW CONCRETE MASONRY
UNITS & MORTAR:
"Hollow concrete blocks to comply with A.S.T.M.
Specifications (latest issue.) To have minimum face
shell thickness of 114" or over and to have a compres·
sive strength of at least 700 lbs. per square inch over
the average gross area for each unit. All units to be
load hearing. Units to he medium textured."
The blocks that were used in said theater were con·
crete blocks made of the lightweight aggregate called pumice.
(R 1168, 1243, 1244) It was plaintiff's contention that
the only block that could be used according to the plans and
specification was a block made of cement, sand and gravel.
(R 404-431) In other words a block using a heavyweight
aggregate. ( D-33, page 5) The pumice block used by de·
fend ant is a block using a lightweight aggregate ( D-33, page
5), however there can be no dispute that under the specifi·
cations of the contract the lightweight aggregate, pumice
block is authorized.
Tests were made by the "Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory"
to determine whether the blocks of the Richy Theater com·
plied with the above requirements. Blocks were actually
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removed from the theater walls and tested. The uncontradicted evidence is that the blocks used in the theater exceed the requirements of the specifications and the A.S.T.M.
Standards. (See D-62, 63) The A.S.T.M. standards and accordingly the specifications set up test for compressive
strength and moisture content, (See P-28, D-32) and no
others.
The A.S.T.M. Standards state: D-32, 28
"HOLLOW LOAD-BEARING CONCRETE
MASONRY UNITS.
Scope
l. These specifications cover hollow load-bearing concrete masonry wall units made from portland
cement and suitable aggregates such as sand, gravel,
crushed stone, bituminous or anthracite cinders, burned
clay or shale, and blast-furnace slag."
(The above is taken from page 626 of the hook
A.S.T.M. Standards, 1949, exh. D.-32)
According to the testimony of both Mr. Jean Driggs,
the plaintiff's expert witness, and Mr. Robert Sanks, the
defendant's expert witness, suitable aggregates for concrete
blocks consist of heavyweight and lightweight aggregates.
(R 236-256, 1054, 1055, 1133, 1134). See also Exh. P-36,
P-35, P-29, at page 2, D-34, D-33 at page 15) According to
A.S.T.M. Specifications the following are suitable lightweight aggregates: (D-31) (page 720, of book, A.S.T.M.
Standards, 1949)
"LIGHTWEIGHT AGGREGATES FOR CONCRETE
"Scope
"1. These specifications cover lightweight aggregates suitable for use in concrete.
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"2. (a) Lightweight aggregates shall consist of
pumice, lava, tufa, slag, burned clay, burned shale, cinders derived from the high-temperature combustion of
coal or coke showing a loss on ignition of not more 25
percent ( 40 percent) 3, * * * ."
There was no competent evidence to dispute the above
evidence. Plaintiff produced a Mr. Paul Evans, a licensed
architect, who prepared the plans and specifications for plaintiff, who testified over objection that a "HOLLOW CONCRETE MASONRY UNIT" does not cover a "HOLLOW
CONCRETE BLOCK," therefore a blo.ck made of cement,
sand and gravel was required under the plaintiff's contract.
Further, that when he made up the specifications of plaintiff's
contract he only intended that a block composed of cement,
sand and gravel used. (R 404-431 incl.) How the lower
court could make a finding, based upon this testimony, that
defendant had not complied with the contract is absolutely
without understanding.
Both plaintiff and Mr. Paul Evans, the architect, who
prepared the plans and specifications for the contract, were
at said theater at the time the walls were being erected and
neither of them objected to the type of block being used.
(R 430, 365-367 incl.) And even after making an examina·
tion of the masonry with respect to the joints and grouting
and the separate agreement of January 7, 1950, being
entered into, neither plaintiff nor Mr. Evans ever complained
or objected to the type of block used. (R 365, 366, 367, 430)
Plaintiff specifically testified at the trial that the only com·
plaints he had, at the time of said agreement, were the ones
contained in said agreement ( exh. P -5) . ( R 365, 366) If
plaintiff had any rights he has waived them by his own action
and conduct and is now estopped to claim any damages.
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The following authorities are cited with reference to the
question of waiver as set forth in defendant's arguments I, II,

IV, V.:
17 Corpus Juris Secundum page 1100, Contracts par.
514 b, Building and Construction Contracts. "An acceptance of the work or structure, as in compliance with the contract, will ordinarily constitute a waiver of a full performance
or defective performance of a building contract and such
acceptance may be expressed or implied from the conduct
of the owner. Whether or not his acts amount to an acceptance is generally a question of fact depending on all the
circumstances of the case. Thus, although particular circumstances in a given case may require a different holding some
of the defects may be waived by the owner's failing to object
thereto at the proper time, and specifically calling the builder's attention to other defects; hut a waiver of one defect is
not a waiver of other defects.

* * * *

"(2) Occupancy or Use. Possession or use, however,
is evidence of acceptance or waiver, and, when considered
in connection with other circumstances, such as some act or
some language on the part of the owner, may he sufficient
to show an acceptance or acquiescence.

* * * ."

See also Sirch Electrical, etc., Laboratories v. Garbutt,
110 P 140, 13 Cal App 435, where the court held that where
there is acceptance, after knowledge of the defects, the owner
is deemed to have waived the defects.
Morgan v. Plotkin 189 N.W. 63, 219 Mich 265, where
the court held that the owner of a building by his silence
and apparent acquiescence with full knowledge of how the
work was being done by a contractor for installing piping,
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followed by his taking possession of and selling the property,
in effect ratified and accepted the job, and cannot at a later
time under changed conditions, to the disadvantage of the
contractor seeking enforcement of a lien, be heard to complain.
Larsen v. Knight__ ______ u________ , 233 P2d 365, 372, where
the court stated:
"Do these circumstances show such a situation and such
conduct on the part of the plaintiffs as to justify the trial
court's conclusion that the defendant was excused from his
promise to install the ski tow. Do they amount to a waiver
or estoppel? We believe they do. A party claiming a right
ought not to appear to acquiesce in non-performance by the
other party until the time has gone by for such performance
and then claim damages. * * * ."
Rehr v. West 76 N.E. 2d 808, 333 Ill App. 160, where
the court held that the acceptance by the owner of a cement
floor constructed by a contractor and the payment therefor
constituted a waiver of all visible defects or such as could
be ascertained by inspection and examination, but was not
a waiver of latent defects.
Leonard v. Home Builders, 174 Cal. 65, 161 P 1151,
where the court held that payment is evidence to be con·
sidered in the question of waiver.
II
PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY RIGHTS HE MAY
HAVE HAD WITH REFERENCE TO THE COURT'S
FINDING OF A LACK OF MORTAR IN THE MA·
SONRY AND IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER
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COURT TO AWARD ANY DAMAGES FOR THE
SAME.
Approximately the first part of January 1950, prior to
plaintiff taking possession of the said theater building, there
arose some differences with reference to the construction of
said building and as a result plaintiff and defendant and
defendant's subcontractor, Third Party Defendant Henry L.
Ashton entered into a separate agreement. Prior thereo plaintiff and his architect, Mr. Paul Evans, had been on the construction site, examined the building and the masonry work.
As a result thereof the agreement of January 7, 1950, was
entered into which is as follows:
"Mr. Alvie Peterson
January 7, 1950
1241 Whitlock Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah
"Dear Sir:
"In accordance with our discussion with you and Mr.
Evans, your architect and as was verbally agreed at that
meeting, we propose to thoroughly point up and fill all masonry joints in the exterior of the hollow block masonry work on
your theatre at 838 West North Temple. We also propose
to paint these walls with a heavy coat of lead and oil paint.
"This work is to he done in full compensation for our
failure to install certain items of steel, in the hollow block
pilasters and walls, in a satisfactory manner, also for our
failure to fill pilaster cores with cement mortar and to completely bed vertical block joints as shown and specified.
/s/
/s/

Henry L. Ashton
Roydon K. McCullough

"Accepted :
"/s/ Alvie Peterson
"Date 1-10-50
"(See Exh. P-5)"
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At the time of the signing of the agreement of January
7, 1950, the masonry work was just about completed. Plaintiff estimated it about two-thirds complete, but immediately
thereafter the masonry was completed. (R 366, 367) Plain·
tiff visited the premises on an average of twice a day, inspected the work, and when it came time to do the painting
of the exterior walls, in accordance with said January 7th
agreement, plaintiff selected the color of the paint to be used
and was present when at least part of the wall was being
painted. Plaintiff at no time complained or objected to the
way in which the paint was applied or that the joints had not
been properly filled or tooled or pointed up, according to the
agreement of January 7, 1950. (R 340-345 incl., 1291, 281,
308)
Further, on the 19th of April 1951, more than one
year after the building had been turned over to plaintiff,
plaintiff requested defendant to submit a hid on an addi·
tional portion of the building. Even at that time, more than
a year later, plaintiff made no objection or complaint with
reference to the construction of the said building. (R 334,
341,845)
Defendant and his subcontractor went to additional expense to satisfy plaintiff. Plaintiff was present twice a day,
saw the work being performed, examined it, had his architect
examine it, allowed defendant and his subcontractor to pro·
ceed with the construction, and now plaintiff complains and
is awarded damages for the very elements that plaintiff ac·
quiesced in. Plaintiff waived his rights, if he had any, and
he is now estopped to claim injury and damages and the
lower court should have refused the same.
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III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SIGNING THE
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT OF WILLIAM A. EARL AND WILLIAM
A. EARL JR., THE PLASTERING SUBCONTRACTORS AND FURTHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED,
IN SPECIFICALLY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE SAID
JUDGMENT, CONCLUSIONS, AND FINDINGS PURSUANT TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION.
At the conclusion of the evidence and after the parties
had rested, motions were made on behalf of the Third Party
Defendants for dismissal of Third Party Defendant's complaint. The court denied the motions of Ashton and Earls,
however, with respect to the motion of Third Party Defendant Buehner Cinder Block, the court granted their motion
for dismissal. At that time counsel for Third Party Plaintiff cited to the court our Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54
(b), pertaining to judgment being entered upon multiple
claims. Said rule is as follows:
"(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims. When
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim, a final judgment may be entered upon one
or more but less than all of the claims only upon an
express determination by the court that there is no
just reason for delay and upon an express direction
for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, which adjudicates less
than all the claims shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims, and the order or other form of
decision is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims."
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Thereupon the court specifically ordered that judgment
would not be entered upon any of the claims until such time
as it was entered on all of the claims at the same time. The
express order of the court is set forth in full in defendant's
statement of fact and is therefore not repeated here. Not·
withstanding the foregoing, the court, in absolute derogation
of Third Party Plaintiff's rights, on August 12, 1954 entered
judgment for the Earls. No notice was given either by the
court or counsel for the Earls that the judgment had been
entered. It was not until approximately two months later,
that counsel for Third Party Plaintiff was advised that judg·
ment for the Earls had been signed two months before. Third
Party Plaintiff relied upon the express order of the court
and the integrity of the court and had a right to rely thereon,
and Third Party Defendant should not be prejudiced on his
appeal by such action.
Third Party Defendant immediately filed with the court
a motion objecting to the court signing anymore judgments,
and specifically the plaintiffs, and asked that the judgment
of the Earls be vacated. The court, however, signed the
plaintiff's judgment, and defendant filed another motion to
have plaintiff's judgment vacated until judgment could he
entered on all of the claims at the same time. On the 9th
of November 1954, the court heard the above motions and
denied the same.
Certainly, based upon such a record of procedure Third
Party Plaintiffs appeal with respect to the judgment of Third
Party Defendant Earl should not be prejudiced by failing
to appeal within the one month period from the date of
entry of judgment.
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The findings, conclusions and judgment of Third Party
Defendant Buehner Cinder Block Company were never
signed or filed by the court until after notice of appeal had
been filed with this court. The predicament, in which the
lower court placed Third Party Plaintiff is manifestly unfair.

IV
PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED SAID THEATER
BUILDING, TOOK POSSESSION OF THE SAME,
PAID FOR THE SAME AND MADE NO OBJECTION
OR COMPLAINTS, THEREFORE PLAINTIFF HAS
WAIVED ANY RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE HAD AND
IS NOW ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING DAMAGES,
AND IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO
AWARD DAMAGES.
It is defendant's contention that if plaintiff had any
rights, with reference to defects in said building, or unsuitable and inferior materials being used, that he has by his
conduct and actions, acquiescsed in the same, and waived
any rights he may have had. The following facts are undisputed:

1. That on April 13, 1950, defendant turned said theater building over to plaintiff and plaintiff examined and
took possession of the same and commenced his theater
operation without making objection or complaint to defendant. ( R 835, 320-327)
2. That the contract provides that final payment shall
be made within ten days after substantial completion. Final
payment was made by plaintiff at the time of taking possession of the said building, by plaintiff issuing to defend-
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ant a promissory note for $,1,000.00, the final balance owing
on said contract, and which note was finally paid in full by
plaintiff to defendant personally on March 1, 1951. (R 837,
838, 839)
3. At the time of the signing of the agreement of Jan·
uary 7, 1950, the masonry work was just about completed.
Plaintiff estimated it about two-thirds complete, but immediately thereafter the masonry was completed, and defendant
specifically testified that he had no other complaints or objections, other than those specified in the said agreement.
(R 365-367)
4. Plaintiff visited the premises on an average of twice
a day, inspected the work, and testified that he had experience
in the building business. ( R 355, 326)
5. When it came time to do the painting required in
the agreement of January 7, 1950, plaintiff selected the color
of the paint to be used and was present when at least part of
the wall was being painted. Plaintiff at no time complained
or objected to the way in which the paint was applied or that
the joints had not been properly filled or tooled or pointed
up, or that there were any other defects. (R 340-345 incl.,
1291, 281, 308)
6. Further, on the 19th of April 1951, more than one
year after the building had been turned over to plaintiff,
plaintiff requested defendant to submit a bid on an addi·
tional portion of the building. Even at that time, more than
a year later, plaintiff made no objection or complaint with
reference to the construction of said theater building. {R 334,
341, 845)
If plaintiff had any rights certainly he has waived the
same by his own conduct and action.
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v
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT DEFENDANT AND THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF HAD WAIVED ANY RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE
HAD AGAINST THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT
HENRY L. ASHTON, THE MASONRY SUBCONTRACTOR, AND AGAINST WILLIAM A. EARL AND
WILLIAM A. EARL JR., THE PLASTERING SUBCONTRACTORS.
The lower court in its findings of facts, conclusions and
judgment in favor of the Third Party Defendants stated that
Third Party Plaintiff accepted and approved the work of the
subcontractors, paid for the same, made no objection thereto,
and therefore waived any claim he may have had.
Defendant, in his third party complaint, alleged that
plaintiff was suing him for breach of the original contract,
incorporated plaintiff's complaint as a part of his own complaint, alleged that Third Party Defendants, as subcontractors, agreed to construct a portion of said building and to
do so in accordance with the plans and specifications of the
original contract between plaintiff and defendant, and prayed
that if the court found for plaintiff on any portion of the
construction work which the subcontractors had agreed to
perform, then and in such case defendant have judgment
against said subcontractors in the same amount as plaintiff
was awarded judgment. Third Party Defendants admitted
that they agreed to do the work in accordance with the plans
and specifications of the original contract between plaintiff
and defendant.
Third Party Plaintiff, in his entire case, attempted to
show that in truth and fact there were no defects in said build-
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ing and no unsuitable materials or defective workmanship,
and that said building was built according to the specifications and the changes agreed to by plaintiff.
With reference to the building blocks Third Party Plaintiff testified that because, under the specifications, different
types of aggregates could be used in the blocks he. and
Third Party Defendant Ashton contacted plaintiff and it was
agreed that a block containing a lightweight aggregate was
to be used and the pumice block was selected. Third Party
Defendant Ashton confirmed this conversation. ( R 852,

1243-1248).
There is no question that Third Party Plaintiff accepted
the work of the subcontractors, made no objection thereto and
paid them for the same. The same factors are present in
plaintiff's case. The plaintiff accepted and took possession
of the building, paid for it and made no objection thereto,
yet the court found in one case that Third Party Plaintiff
by such conduct waived his rights, however, under the same
set of circumstances the plaintiff does not waive anything.
The result would appear to be somewhat incongruous.
The Third Party Plaintiff, as set forth in his complaint,
relied upon the evidence of plaintiff. The only evidence sub·
mitted by defendant was in defense of plaintiff's case and
the court ruled against him. Under such a set of circum·
stances the court would also have to find against the subcon·
tractors.
With reference to the plastering of the said theater build·
ing, the court held that there was defective plaster used,
which therefore required that the building be replastered.
The only basis upon which the court could say that plaintiff
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had not waived his rights would be that the defective plaster
presented a latent defect which was not discoverable by reasonable inspection. The testimony of plaintiff, on cross
examination by counsel for the Earls, was to the effect that
the cracking in the plaster did not commence to appear until
July of 1951, i.e., after the building had passed through an
entire summer and winter. (R 360, 361) If such is to be
the basis upon which the lower court bases its finding, then
surely the same finding must pertain as between defendant
and his subcontractor. The fact that no defects appeared
until a year and a half after plaintiff took possession of the
building bears out defendant's testimony that he accepted
the plaster work approved it and paid for it. Defendant
would have no reason not to accept it. If a latent defect,
which did not appear until over a year after plaintiff took
possession would prevent a waiver of plaintiff's rights, certainly the same latent defect would preclude the subcontractor
from saying that defendant had waived his rights.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion it is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the lower court, with respect to the defendant and
plaintiff should be reversed and it should be held that plaintiff by reason of his conduct and actions has waived any
rights that he may have had. However, in the event, this court
decides that plaintiff's judgment should not be reversed,
then this court should hold that defendant's subcontractor
Henry L. Ashton and William A. Earl and William A. Earl
Jr., are liable for that portion of the damages attributable
to them and the lower court sitting as trier of fact should
be instructed to apportion the damages found in Plaintiff's
judgment between Ashton and Ear Is.
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Further, with respect to the building blocks, the judgment of the lower court should be reversed on the ground
that the competent undisputed evidence demonstrates without
question that the building blocks are within the requirements
of the specifications.
Respectfully submitted
McCuLLOUGH, BoYCE AND McCuLLOUGH
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